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330 
PROVING SHAREHOLDER ELIGIBILITY UNDER 
RULE 14A-8(B) 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Rule 14a-8 requires management to include a properly submitted 
shareholder proposal in the company’s proxy materials.1 The Rule, how-
ever, limits applicability to owners holding at least $2,000 in market val-
ue of the company’s securities, or 1%, of the outstanding voting shares 
for at least one year through the date of the meeting.2 Beneficial owners 
must establish their eligibility by submitting a written statement from the 
record holder.3 The registrant has fourteen days to provide notification of 
any deficiency in the required proof and the owner has fourteen days to 
respond.4  
The share ownership requirements of subsection (b) have been 
among the most common and reliable methods for barring proposals 
from company’s proxy materials.5 Problems with establishing eligibility 
range from inclusion of the wrong dates in the letter from the broker, the 
failure to obtain a letter from a broker not participating in Cede & Co., 
and inability to own shares for the requisite amount of time in newly 
public companies.6 
This Article will focus on the eligibility requirements for sharehold-
ers, particularly for street name holders. Part II of this Article will lay out 
the administrative history of the ownership requirements in Rule 14a-
8(b). Part III of the Article will trace the interpretation of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) staff on the provision, 
with emphasis on how shareholders proves their ownership of the re-
quired value of securities continuously for one full year. Finally, part IV 
of the Article will suggest potential improvements.  
  
 1. Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942).  
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2011). Evidence may also be obtained from certain SEC 
filings.   
 3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(2) (2011). 
 4. Craig Eastland, Through(out) the Looking-Glass: Proving Eligibility to Submit a Share-
holder Proposal Under SEC Rule 14a-8(b), THOMSON REUTERS (May, 2014), 
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/news-views/corporate-counsel/through-out-
the-looking-glass-proving-eligibility-to-submit-a-shareholder-proposal-under-sec-rule. 
 5. Id.; see also Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season, GIBSON 
DUNN (June 28, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Shareholder-Proposal-
Developments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf.  
 6. Id. 
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY  
A. The Early Period 
Enacted in 1942, Rule 14a-87 initially applied to “qualified” security 
holders.8 In 1954, the Commission extended the provision to “any securi-
ty holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security holders of the issuer”.9 
The Rule did not explicitly reference beneficial owners, although the 
staff administratively acceded the right to these investors.10 The provi-
sion did not, however, require the ownership of a specified number of 
shares or mandate a minimum holding period.  
Changes made in 1976 codified the staff’s position on the need to 
hold shares through the date of meeting and the right of beneficial own-
ers to submit proposals under the Rule.11 The Commission also received 
comments urging the implementation of “eligibility requirements”.12 
Some favored the imposition of a minimum ownership threshold in 
order to curtail potential abuse and limit the number of proposals.13 Oth-
ers, however, opposed eligibility requirements, contending that: (1) 
minimum ownership thresholds created the appearance of discrimination 
against small shareholders; (2) computation of share values could raise 
practical difficulties because of changing market prices; (3) a holding 
period, when added to the early time for submission, disadvantaged in-
vestors; and (4) the limitations would have had little effect on reducing 
the number of proposals.14  
The staff agreed with the opponents and concluded that the lack of 
eligibility requirements did not result in abuse and, declined to impose 
  
 7. Timothy L. Feagans, SEC Rule 14a-8: New Restrictions on Corporate Democracy, 33 
BUFF. L. REV. 225 n.1 (1984) (explaining that in 1942, the shareholder proposal rule was originally 
“x-14a-7,” later changed and renumbered, it required corporate management to include in its proxy 
materials any non-management proposal that was a “proper subject for action by the security hold-
ers.”).  
 8. Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, The 1983 Amendment to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A 
Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1984); see also Exchange Act Release 
No. 3347, supra note 1. 
 9. Tomas M. Clusserath, Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later, 40 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 13, 50 (1964).  
 10. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3998 (Oct. 10, 1947); see also AMY L. GOODMAN, JOHN F. 
OLSON, & LISA A. FONTENOT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 
(5th ed. 2016) (“Any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security holders of the issu-
er and which is accompanied by notice of his intention to present the proposal for action at the 
meeting.”).   
 11. Exchange Act Release No. 9343 (July 7, 1976).  
 12. Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976).   
 13. Id. (“Among such recommendations were that the proponent be required to have been a 
security holder of the issuer for a minimum period of time (e.g., six months or one year) prior to the 
submission of his proposal, or that the proponent be required to own at the time of submission a 
minimum investment interest in the issuer, either in terms of a minimum number of shares or a 
minimum dollar amount according to the market value of the securities.”).   
 14. Sadat-Keeling, supra note 8, at 176.   
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the requested requirements.15 The staff reiterated the position in a subse-
quent study of Rule 14a-8.16  
B. The Addition of Ownership and Holding Requirements 
The Commission nonetheless revisited the idea in 1982. The pro-
posing release sought comment on amendments to require ownership of 
$1,000 or 1% of the market value of the voting securities for one year.17 
The Commission reasoned that that the requirement would ensure that 
submitting shareholders had “some measured economic stake or invest-
ment interest in the corporation”18 and that the Rule was unavailable to 
“activists of one kind or another” who used “a share of stock as the pass-
key to the proxy bullhorn.”19 
The Commission amended the rule in 1987 to specify the documen-
tary proof needed to establish ownership by beneficial owners.20 Street 
name and beneficial owners were to submit a written statement from the 
record holder verifying continuous ownership and “his or her eligibility 
to submit a proposal to the company.”21 The exclusion was intended to 
relieve registrants and the Commission of unnecessary administrative 
burdens and costs associated with the filing and processing of proxy ma-
terials.22 
C. Final Adjustments 
The Commission decided to rewrite the Rule in plain English in 
1997 and, as part of that process, revise and adjust the ownership to re-
flect the effects of inflation.23 The proposal sought to raise the eligibility 
  
 15. Exchange Act Release No. 12999, supra note 12.   
 16. Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, presented to Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 
96th Cong., 20 Sess. 34-35, 181-82  (Sept. 4, 1980) (“The staff’s own examination has produced 
little support for the rational that a reasonable ‘minimum investment’ requirement would eliminate a 
substantial proportion of the proposals or, more importantly, that it would distinguish between those 
which were offered in good faith and those which were frivolous or abusive.”). 
 17. Exchange Act Release No. 12999, supra note 12 (“The one-year ownership requirement 
sought to curtail abuse of the rule by requiring a continuous investment interest for those who put the 
company and other shareholders to the expense of including a proposal in proxy materials.”). 
 18. Exchange Act Release No. 19135 (Oct.14,1982).  
 19. This proposal originated from a speech by former Commissioner Bevis Longstreth. The 
S.E.C. and Shareholder proposals: Simplification in Regulation, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶83,067, at 84,708 (Dec. 23, 1981).This proposal also included notice, timing, 
minimum investment, and minimum holding requirements. See Exchange Act Release No. 19135, 
supra note 18, at 47, 420, 47,422–23, 47, 434–35. 
 20. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-25217 (Dec. 21, 1987). 
 21. See id.; SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F (Oct. 18, 2011) (providing the following sample 
language to include in a proof of ownership letter that would satisfy the requirements of Rule 14a-
8(b): “As of [the date the proposal is submitted], [name of shareholder] held, and has held continu-
ously for at least one year, [number of securities] shares of [company name] [class of securities.]”). 
 22. See Exchange Act Release No. 25217, supra note 20. 
 23. Séan Patrick O'Brien, The 1983 Amendments to SEC Rule 14A-8: Upsetting a Precarious 
Balance, 19 VAL. U. L. REV. 221, 224 art. 9 (1984); Exchange Act Release No. 12999, supra note 
12.  
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threshold to $2,000.24 The amendment balanced a “meaningful” increase 
against the need to provide “an avenue of communication for small in-
vestors.”25 The Commission received little opposition to the changes and 
adopted them as proposed.26 
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION  
In establishing the ownership requirements, the staff has required 
the use an average of the bid and ask price.27 Specifically, the staff in-
structed shareholders to look to “whether at any time within sixty days 
before the proposal submission, their investment was valued at $2,000 or 
more, based on the average of bid and ask prices.”28 To the extent una-
vailable, shareholders may rely on the highest selling price during the 
prior sixty days.29 
With respect to the ownership and holding period requirements, 
record ownership raises few concerns since the company possesses the 
required proof.30 The same, however, is not true of beneficial owners. A 
letter from the proponent will not suffice even when disclosing the num-
ber of shares and relevant brokerage account.31 The shareholder must 
instead provide documentation from the relevant broker.32 At the same 
time, monthly, quarterly or other periodic investment statements for the 
  
 24. See Proposed Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, U.S. SECURITY AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-39093.htm (noting since the 
Rule's adoption inflation has only accounted for $600. The SEC proposes the $1,000 increase “to 
account for future inflation, and because it will be easier to use for calculations.”).  
 25. Rules and Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 102 (Thursday, May 28, 1998) (stating small share-
holders who equally with other holders have a strong interest in maintaining channels of communi-
cation with management and fellow shareholders.)  
 26. Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 26, 1998). 
 27. Exchange Act Release No. 34-2009 (Aug. 16, 1983). The bid price is that which dealers 
are currently offering to buy the security for. The asked price is that which dealers are currently 
offering to sell the security for. K. Smith & D. Eiteman, Essentials of Investing, 77-78 (1974). Quo-
tations of such bid and asked prices for an over-the-counter stock may be secured through stock-
brokers who can obtain information through a computerized net- work that furnishes continuous 
quotations or through printed sheets that are revised daily. SOLOMON, supra note 6, at 803. The 
aggregate worldwide market value of the issuer's outstanding voting and non-voting common equity 
shall be computed by use of the price at which the common equity was last sold, or the average of 
the bid and asked prices of such common equity, in the principal market for such common equity. L. 
Solomon, R. Stevenson, & D. Schwartz, Corporations, 461 (1982).  
 28. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, Exchange Act Release No. SLB-14 (July 13, 2001).  
 29. Id. 
 30. See News Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2171020, at *2 (July 27, 2010) (stating 
“Where, however, the company cannot verify record ownership, the proposal can be excluded.”); see 
also Schering-Plough Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 27, 2009) (stating “[t]he Company 
also had its transfer agent conduct a search of the Company's record holders, and it was unable to 
find any record indicating Mr. Loeb is a record holder of any shares.”). 
 31. See Am. Stores Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176969 (Apr. 8, 1991) (stating 
“[w]hile Raymondale's affidavits provided the name of the brokerage account in which its 150 
American Stores shares are supposedly held, Raymondale provided no independent confirmation 
from the broker that such shares have been held for Raymondale for at least one year.”).   
 32. Exchange Act Release No. 25217, supra note 20; See also Media Gen., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2001 WL 114961 (February 8, 2001). 
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broker will not constitute adequate proof of continuous ownership.33 
Beneficial owners must establish ownership either through reference to 
an eligible SEC filing or through a letter from the record owner.34 Record 
owner includes banks and brokers participating in a depository.35 
The need for a letter from the broker or bank has given rise to a 
number of issues. These include the ability (or inability) to obtain an 
appropriate letter from the record owner, the problems that arise with 
changes of brokers during the year, the use of introducing brokers and 
the applicability of the holding period to companies that recently went 
public.36 
A. Problems with Broker Letters  
In some cases, the letter provided by the broker or other record 
owner will not include the information necessary to establish eligibility. 
The letter may not, for example, encompass the entire twelve month pe-
riod or may fail to include the date of submission of the proposal.37 Let-
ters from record owners may also attest to beneficial ownership for a 
  
 33. See e.g., Duke Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 338408 (Feb. 7, 2002) 
(noting a company asserting that any “periodic investment statement” from a broker is insufficient to 
establish continuous ownership requirement). Exchange Act Release No. 25217, supra note 20 
(stating that “monthly, quarterly or other periodic investment statements” from broker insufficient to 
establish continuous ownership requirement).   
 34. Exchange Act Release No. 25217, supra note 20, at Section C.l.c of SLB 14; Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 14F (CF), supra note 21; (“You can confirm whether your broker or bank is a DTC 
participant by asking your broker or bank or by checking DTC's participant list, which is available 
at http://www.dtcc.com/client-center/dtc-directories.”); David M. Lynn & Anna T. Pinedo, Fre-
quently Asked Questions About Shareholder Proposals and Proxy Access, MORRISON & FOERSTER 
LLP (2015), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questions-about-shareholder-
proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf (stating that beneficial owners may providing proof of ownership by 
proving a copy of a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4, Form 5, or amendments to those 
documents or updated forms, reflecting the shareholder’s ownership of the shares as of or before the 
date on which the one-year eligibility period begins  or by submitting a written statement “from the 
‘record’ holder of [the] securities (usually a broker or bank),” verifying that, “at the time the pro-
posal was submitted, the shareholder held the required amount of securities continuously for at least 
one year.”) 
 35. Today, the most commonly used depository is the Depository Trust Company (DTC), a 
registered clearing agency acting as a securities depository. As a result, record ownership appears in 
the name DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co.  
 36. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14g.htm (asserting that the staff will not “concur in the exclu-
sion of a proposal under Rules 14a-8(b) … on the basis that a proponent's proof of ownership does 
not cover the one-year period preceding and including the date the proposal is submitted unless the 
company provides a notice of defect that identifies the specific date on which the proposal was 
submitted and explains that the proponent must obtain a new proof of ownership letter verifying 
continuous ownership of the requisite amount of securities for the one-year period preceding and 
including such date to cure the defect.”) 
 37. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F, supra note 21 (“In some cases, the letter speaks as of a date 
before the date the proposal is submitted, thereby leaving a gap between the date of the verification 
and the date the proposal is submitted. In other cases, the letter speaks as of a date after the date the 
proposal was submitted but covers a period of only one year, thus failing to verify the shareholder’s 
beneficial ownership over the required full one-year period preceding the date of the proposal’s 
submission.”). 
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specified date without referencing the continuous ownership require-
ment.38 
In Johnson and Johnson,39 the proponent submitted a letter showing 
continuous ownership of shares since “November of 2011” but did not 
otherwise “sufficiently pinpoint the dates for which the proponent had 
ownership of its stock.”40 In Coca-Cola Company,41 the staff granted 
relief where the documentary proof provided by the proponent referred to 
the wrong beneficial owner. 
In some cases, the letter submitted by the proponent failed to in-
clude the dates need to meet the continuous ownership requirement. In 
Bank of America Corporation,42 the letter verified ownership from Janu-
ary 22, 2009 through November 18, 2014. The one-year period for pur-
poses of Rule 14a-8, however, ran through November 22, 2014, the date 
the proposal was submitted to the Company. The letter did not, therefore, 
demonstrate that “the shares were held continuously during the required 
one-year period.”43 Similarly, in Union Pacific, the proponent submitted 
its proposal on December 3, 2009. The letter, however, stated that the 
proponent held the shares for one year from December 11, 2009, provid-
ing a gap of eight days.44 
B. Changes in Brokers or Custodians 
Gaps in ownership may potentially appear as a result of changes in 
brokers or custodians.45 To meet the continuous ownership requirement, 
investors must demonstrate that the transfer to the new account did not 
involve a sale. Doing so requires ownership verification from multiple 
brokers and an explanation for any apparent gap.46 Exclusion will occur 
  
 38. Id. (stating [t]he Commission recommends the following language: “As of [date the pro-
posal is submitted], [name of shareholder] held, and has held continuously for at least one year, 
[number of securities] shares of [company name] [class of securities]. - This format is acceptable for 
purposes of Rule 14a-8(b), but it is not mandatory or exclusive.) 
 39. Johnson & Johnson, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6723105 (Jan. 8, 2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. The Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 353402 (Feb. 4, 2008). 
 42. Bank of Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 81901 (Feb. 11, 2015).  
 43. Id.; See also DST Sys. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 606197 (Feb. 4, 2014). 
 44. Union Pac. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 97617 (Jan. 29, 2010). 
 45. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F, supra note 21, at Section C. (“In some cases, the letter 
speaks as of a date before the date the proposal was submitted, thereby leaving a gap between the 
date of verification and the date the proposal was submitted. In other cases, the letter speaks as of a 
date after the date the proposal was submitted but covers a period of only one year, thus failing to 
verify the proponent’s beneficial ownership over the required full one-year period preceding the date 
of the proposal’s submission.”). 
 46. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G, supra note 36 (stating: “We are concerned that com-
panies' notices of defect are not adequately describing the defects or explaining what a proponent 
must do to remedy defects in proof of ownership letters. For example, some companies' notices of 
defect make no mention of the gap in the period of ownership covered by the proponent's proof of 
ownership letter or other specific deficiencies that the company has identified.”); Exxon Mobil 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 3332189 (Feb. 23, 2015) (stating that the shares were trans-
ferred not sold: “Company believed because the Systems' initial bank custodian, Bank of New York 
Mellon, submitted proof of ownership letters for the period from October 20, 2013 through October 
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where the street name owner fails to provide proof that a sale did not 
occur.47 
In Chevron Corporation,48 the shareholder changed bank custodians 
during the year. The shareholder submitted a letter from one bank stating 
the shares were held through October 31 and from another confirming 
that the shares were held since November 1. The shares appeared in two 
different accounts, one on October 31 and the other on November 1. As a 
result, the company argued that the shares could have been sold on one 
day and repurchased the next, thereby failing to meet the continuous 
ownership requirement.49 The shareholder, however, pointed out the lo-
gistical difficulties in the simultaneous sale of three million shares by 
portfolio managers and that the trading volume that day did not reflect an 
unusual increase.50 Staff denied the no-action request.51 
C. Introducing Brokers 
Beneficial owners obtain the required letter from their broker. Not 
all brokers, however, will suffice. Investors sometimes have accounts 
with an introducing broker.52 An introducing broker engages with the 
customer but does not typically maintain control of the client’s funds or 
securities.53 Introducing brokers instead rely on clearing brokers to per-
form these functions. Clearing brokers in turn participate in the Deposi-
tory Trust Company (DTC).54 Since introducing brokers generally do not 
participate in DTC, they typically do not appear on DTC’s securities 
position listing.55 
  
31, 2013, and the Systems' successor bank custodian, State Street, submitted proof of ownership 
letters for the period from November 1, 2013 through October 28, 2014, the Systems must have sold 
and repurchased their Chevron shares between October 31 and November 1, 2013, thereby creating 
an alleged "2013 Ownership Gap" between those two successive days.”)  
 47. Id. (noting in Exxon Mobil Corporation, the Proponents provided no evidence within the 
required time for a response to indicate that they transferred their shares of the Company from the 
first to the second broker; and the Company was therefore unable to verify that the Proponents 
continuously held their shares of the Company.); See also The Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2001 WL 78113 (Jan. 19, 2001) (describing when the shareholder transferred Coke shares to 
another broker during the one-year preceding submission of proposal and was unable to provide a 
statement from the broker verifying ownership for a year). 
 48. Chevron Corp, SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 274204 (Feb. 23, 2015). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (stating the shareholder noted an absence of any “spike” in the trading activity of 
Chevron and asserted that, for the “mass divestiture and repurchase” to have occurred, “all of the 
multiple independent managers for each of the NYC Systems [would have to] decide to sell all of 
their three-million-plus Chevron shares (and presumably all shares of all of the Systems” equity 
holdings) on the same day. and buy them back the next.”)  
 51. Id. 
 52. Supra note 10 at 12-26. 
 53. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F, supra note 21; see Net Capital Rule Release, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-31511 (Nov. 24, 1992) [57 FR 56973], at Section II.C. 
 54. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F, supra note 21. 
 55. Id.  
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In 2008, the Staff in The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. agreed that an 
introducing broker could be considered a “record holder.”56 The court in 
Apache v. Chevedden, however, rejected this interpretation, holding that 
a company did not have to accept evidence of ownership from “an unreg-
istered entity that is not a DTC participant” at least “when the company 
has identified grounds for believing that the proof of eligibility is unreli-
able.”57 The court in KBR v. Chevedden58 agreed with the Apache analy-
sis.59 
In 2011, the SEC adopted the positions reflected in the KBR and 
Apache decisions. Only DTC participants would be viewed as “record 
holders,” eliminating introducing brokers from the definition.60 The 
change in positon meant that beneficial owners generally had to obtain 
ownership letters from both the introducing broker and the DTC partici-
pant.61 Shareholders and companies could confirm whether a particular 
broker or bank participated in the depository by checking DTC's partici-
pant list.62 
D. Twelve Month Holding Requirement for Recently Public Companies  
In the case of a newly public company, shareholders acquiring secu-
rities in the initial public offering (IPO) will not, for the first year, meet 
the continuous ownership requirement. Shareholders have argued that in 
these circumstances, the staff should put the holding period aside. In 
Meridian Interstate Bancorp, Inc.,63 however, the SEC determined the 
Rule contained no exemption for shareholders in newly-public compa-
nies. The SEC similarly granted the company no-action relief where the 
proponent purchased the company’s common stock on the date of the 
  
 56. Id. 
 57. Supra note 10, at 12-25. 
 58. See KBR Inc. v. Chevedden, 2011 WL 1463611 (S.D. Tex. 2011) and Apache Corp v. 
Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (concluding that a securities intermediary was not 
a record holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b) because it did not appear on a lit of the company’s 
non-objecting beneficial owners or on any DTC securities position listing, nor was the intermediary 
a DTC participant).  
 59. KBR Inc. v. Chevedden, supra note 58 (finding that letter submitted by introducing broker 
not adequate “because the summary judgment evidence did not show that RTS appeared on either 
the NOBO list or on any “Cede breakdown,” nor was RTS a DTC participant”).   
 60. See supra notes 21 and note 10 at 12-27. 
 61. Id. (stating that letters from an affiliate of a DTC participant, however are considered 
acceptable).  
 62. See supra notes 21 and note 35 (detailing the DTC participant list, 
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/client-center/DTC/alpha.ashx.) 
 63. See Meridian Interstate Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2447326 (June 
17, 2008)  
(“The Division has taken the position on several occasions that a company may exclude proposals 
where the proponent fails to meet, or provide evidence of satisfaction of, the eligibility requirements 
set forth in Rule 14a-8(b).”); see also Anthracite Cap., Inc., (Mar. 11, 2008); Office Depot, Inc., 
(Feb. 25, 2008); New York Community Bancorp, Inc., (Feb. 19,2008); Safeway Inc., (Feb. 6, 
2008); and Exxon Mobil Corp., (Jan. 29, 2008).  
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company’s IPO and submitted a shareholder proposal less than one year 
later.64 
IV. ANALYSIS  
Ownership thresholds remain an important component to the rule. 
Moreover, some commenters favor an increase in these thresholds. Sug-
gestions have included (1) a change in the ownership requirements based 
on a sliding scale related to a company’s size; (2) an increase in the 
length of the holding requirement to mirror the standard frequently used 
for proxy access; (3) additional disclosure by proponents, including their 
intentions, economic interests and holdings in the target company; and 
(4) the raising of the resubmission threshold for proposals that have been 
rejected in previous years.65 
Former SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher argued for dra-
matic increases in 14a-8(b) ownership thresholds to bar “[a]ctivist inves-
tors and corporate gadflies” who have “hijack[ed] the shareholder pro-
posal system.”66 Gallagher proposed either increasing the value of the 
required investment to “perhaps $200,000 or even better, $2 million,” or 
dropping the “flat dollar test ... leaving only a percentage test.” 67 He also 
recommended prolonging the holding period, deeming a one-year hold-
ing period “hardly a serious impediment to some activists.” 
Opposition to these changes exist, particularly because of the dis-
proportionate impact on small investors who, through long term owner-
ship, have demonstrated a continuing interest in a company.68 One possi-
ble solution would be to permit small investors to aggregate their 
  
 64. Hewlett-Packard Enter. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, (“Mr. Chevedden could not have 
owned Company stock ‘continuously ... since July l, 2015’ because the Company was not a publicly 
traded company until November 1, 2015”). 
 65. Supra note 19. (“For proposals related to topics other than director elections, a truly 
reasonable standard could be to use a sliding scale based on the market capitalization of the compa-
ny, with a required ownership percentage of 0.15 percent for proposals submitted to the largest 
companies and up to 1 percent for proposals submitted to smaller companies. Additionally, if a 
proposal were submitted by a group or by a proponent acting by proxy, the ownership percentage 
sliding scale could be increased to up to 3 percent.”) 
 66. Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane Uni-
versity Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Governance (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541315952#_edn10 (“The push to increase 
the eligibility threshold is seen in a number of no-action letters including one from Chevron urging 
the eligibility threshold to be at least $10,000, or 2% of shares entitled to be voted on the proposal. 
3M also pushed for the Commission to revisit the current eligibility requirements to submit stock-
holder proposals under Rule 14a-8(b) (arguing for a requirement of at least 1% of the company's 
outstanding voting stock that has been held for three years.
 
This enhanced eligibility requirement 
would help ensure proxy access stockholder proponents have both a significant stake and a long-
term interest in the company.”)  
 67. See Eastland, supra notes 4; Gallagher, supra note 66. 
 68. Sadat-Keeling, supra note 8, at 179 (“AT&T noted in its comments to the proposed 
amendment it does not seem sensible to forbid a long-time shareholder who has demonstrated a 
continuing interest in a company from participating in the proposal process simply because his 
shareholding is too small.”); Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporate Finance, 
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shares.69 Thresholds, however, would still need to be low enough to pro-
vide small shareholders with meaningful access to the Rule. Moreover, 
the right to aggregate would need to address the serious logistical diffi-
culties that in obtaining a list of shareholders under both state and federal 
law.70 
The debate over thresholds, however, has not adequately focused 
upon the unnecessary complications associated with establishing benefi-
cial ownership. Shareholders, particularly retail investors, often incur 
significant difficulty in obtaining an adequate letter from brokers within 
the relevant time periods.71 Moreover, in the case of an introducing bro-
ker or change in custodian, the beneficial must obtain two letters, exac-
erbating the logistical difficulties. 
The unnecessary complexity has consequences. The ownership 
thresholds and holding period seek to ensure that investors submitting 
proposals have “skin in the game.” The excessive complexity in demon-
strating these requirements, however, all but guarantees that in some 
instances shareholders meeting these requirements will have their pro-
posal excluded. Moreover, by requiring a letter from the broker, the 
Commission has imposed an essential obligation on third parties that do 
not receive compensation for the service and view the matter a “chore.” 
One solution may be to allow the use of monthly broker statements 
that establish ownership over a twelve month period. Statements can 
demonstrate ownership and the length of the holding period.72 To include 
the date of submission, the shareholder could submit the statement from 
the month that included the submission date. These statements could also 
be supported by representations from the beneficial owner that he or she 
had not sold and repurchased the shares during the period. 
  
 69. Exchange Act Release No. 20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38, (Aug. 16, 1983) (stating that holdings 
of proponents will be aggregated in determining the includability of a proposal; up to 20 sharehold-
ers are permitted to aggregate their shares in order to meet the 3% ownership threshold (mutual 
funds under common management and investment control and funds within the same family are 
counted as one holder).  
 70. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010) [75 FR 42982] (stating 
the term “beneficial owner” does not have a uniform meaning under the federal securities laws. It 
has a different meaning in this bulletin as compared to “beneficial owner” and “beneficial owner-
ship” in Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. Our use of the term in this bulletin is not intended 
to suggest that registered owners are not beneficial owners for purposes of those Exchange Act 
provisions). See Exchange Act Release No. 34-12598 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR 29982], at n.2 (“The 
term ‘beneficial owner’ when used in the context of the proxy rules, and in light of the purposes of 
those rules, may be interpreted to have a broader meaning than it would for certain other purpose[s] 
under the federal securities laws, such as reporting pursuant to the Williams Act.”).  
 71. Nonetheless, concerns over documentary evidence have also been raised in connection 
with proposals submitted by large institutional investors.  See Chevron Corp, SEC No-Action Letter, 
2015 WL 274204 (Feb. 23, 2015) (proposal submitted by ****).     
 72. See Understanding Your Brokerage Account Statements, http://www.nasaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/SIFMA-SIPC-NASAA-Broker-Statements-Brochure.pdf (“Your brokerage 
account statement ‘keeps score’ of your investments and reports all transactions during the statement 
period.”). 
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